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What are the proper epistemic aims of social media sites? A great deal of social 
media critique is in the grips of  an Epistemic Apocalypse narrative, which claims that 
the technologies associated with social media have catastrophically undermined our 
traditional knowledge-generating practices, and that the remedy is to recreate our 
pre-catastrophe practices as closely as possible. This narrative relies on a number of 
questionable assumptions, and problematically narrows the imaginative possibilities 
for redesigning social media. Our goal in this paper is to shake off the epistemic 
apocalypse narrative and offer a better account of the epistemic aims of social media. 
I will pursue a critical approach to social epistemology that appreciates the non-ideal 
features of epistemic systems, and the ways in which knowledge production can be 
a site of domination, and apply this framework to thinking about the epistemic 
design of social media sites. I will argue that social systems ought to pursue three 
distinct epistemic goals: promoting good epistemic outcomes for users, realising 
epistemically good institutional features, and achieving structural epistemic justice. 
Although these goals are often mutually supportive, I will consider a number of 
cases in which these values lead to dilemmas about how to design epistemic 
institutions, which can only be resolved by appealing to ethical considerations. I will  




During the 1990s and into the early 2000s, many technologists were motivated by 
what Barbrook and Cameron (1995) called the Californian Ideology. This view 
promised that developments in communication technologies would lead to a 
blossoming of individual freedoms, a democratisation of discourse, and a renewal of 
democratic values. Suffice to say that these promises have not been realised. 
Academic and popular discourse about technology is currently gripped by 
something like the inverse of the Californian Ideology, which we might call the 
Epistemic Apocalypse narrative. According to the Epistemic Apocalypse narrative, the 
technological developments of the last twenty-to-thirty years have poisoned and 
twisted our knowledge generating practices in ways that have undermined freedom 
of speech and created the conditions for antidemocratic propaganda. These 
problems undermine the epistemic value of democracy, and pose a threat to the 
continued existence of liberal democracies. Those of us in the grips of this 
apocalypse are flailing, both literally and conceptually. In order to even make sense 
of our predicament we need a swathe of neologisms—'fake news’, ‘echo chamber’, 
‘post-truth’—each embedded within an alarming epidemiological and ecological 
metaphors (the ‘virus of fake news’ (Basol, Roozenbeek, van der Linden 2020), the 
‘information pollution’ of misinformation (Lynch 2019), and the ‘junk food diet’ of 
the personalised newsfeed (Pariser 2011)). 
 
While the epistemic apocalypse narrative may have its uses in bringing attention to 
the problems with our online lives, it also profoundly restricts the way we think 
about the epistemology of the internet, and carries over much of the troublesome 
individualism, technodeterminism, and whiggish history that Barbrook and 
Cameron identify in the Californian Ideology. The apocalypse narrative assumes 
that technological development is the harbinger of epistemic catastrophe, that our 
epistemic culture pre-internet (or pre-2016 internet) was a halcyon age, and that our 
primary goal should be to try to painstakingly recreate pre-internet forms of 
sociality. This narrative is undoubtedly appealing, but it is intellectually and 
politically restrictive. Epistemic problems are nothing new: the AIDs crisis, the myth 
that colonised lands were unpopulated, and resistance to the existence of human-
caused climate change are epistemic catastrophes which started long before the 
internet. Although technology certainly plays a role in epistemic crisis, focusing 
attention on it as the sole source of our ills locks us into a technochauvinist mindset 
where all of our problems and solutions are technical ones (Broussard 2018). And, 
comparing our current predicament to a pre-lapsarian state distracts our attention 
from the important task of cultivating new forms of collective organisation that do a 
better job of realising the epistemic goals that we care about.  
 
Our goal in this paper is to begin to collect together the normative tools we need to 
think about our collective epistemic aims, and to begin to think about how we might 
design social media institutions that promote those goals. This project approaches 
social media sites using the tools of systems-oriented social epistemology (Goldman 
2010), in the hope that these sites can become better epistemic tools.  In a way this is 
a hopelessly utopian project. Building better social media—either by improving 
current platforms, or by starting from scratch—is a hugely difficult and time-
consuming task. Any amelioratory project will surely be small and exploratory. 
Nonetheless imagining things otherwise is a politically important tool that can help 
us unsettle our assumptions, and frame new options for social life (Rorty 1983, 
Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002, Biss 2013, Dotson 2018).  
 
This project is incomplete in several ways: 
 
First, I will set to one side some important ethical and political issues about social 
media sites. A full project of redesigning social media sites will address issues of free 
speech in online spaces, and legal questions about the status of social media sites as 
platforms, publishers, or  speakers. One of the lessons of this paper is that the 
epistemic evaluation of social institutions relies on ethical values, so it hopefully 
helps to see us towards a rapprochement between ethical and epistemic evaluation. I 
will not address the view—perhaps a hangover from the Californian Ideology (see 
Barlow 1996)—that social media sites ought only to promote non-epistemic values 
such as freedom of speech. Anyone who feels the draw of the epistemic apocalypse 
narrative is already committed to evaluating social media sites on epistemic 
grounds. 
 
Secondly, in the interests of pushing back against the epistemic apocalypse 
narrative, I will stress the continuities between social media sites and other kinds of 
knowledge-providing institutions. There is a lot more work to be done on the 
epistemic significance of the distinctive features of social media, including the 
algorithmic timeline (Noble 2018), content moderation (Frost-Arnold, forthcoming), 
the incentive structures created by technological systems (Nguyen forthcoming), and 
distinctive discursive practices that emerge online (Marsili 2020), (Pepp, Michaelson, 
and Sterken 2019, MS).  
 
Thirdly, we will focus on the epistemic features of social media systems in isolation 
from wider epistemic practices. A proper consideration of the ways in which the ills 
of social media relate to wider socio-epistemic problems and the epistemic vices of 
users will have to wait for another day.  
 
The plan of action is as follows. In the first section, I will make some ground-clearing 
remarks. In the second section, I will consider the proper epistemic aims of social 
systems in general, making the case that they ought i) to promote good epistemic 
states for their members, ii) to realise epistemically good institutional properties, and 
iii) to achieve structural epistemic justice. I will call an approach to social 
epistemology that integrates considerations of these three goals Critical Social 
Epistemology.1 In the third section, I will demonstrate the importance of thinking 
about these aim together by presenting cases in which the different aims come into 
conflict, and I will argue that we ought to resolve these conflicts by appealing to 
ethical considerations. In the fourth section, I will apply the framework of critical 
social epistemology to social media sites. I will first consider several debates about 
the design of social media that appeal to these aims. I will then show how the 
conflicts between these three epistemic justice can also illuminate debates about the 
design of social media sites. I suggest that highly connected networks might be 
epistemically good for individuals, but bad for groups, consider the value of a 
fragmented public sphere in conditions of epistemic oppression, and explore how 
structural epistemic justice can conflict with the promotion of majoritarian epistemic 
interests. In the final section, summarise some important features of the project of a 
critical social epistemology of social media in more detail. 
 
1. Social Media 
 
 
1 I borrow this term from (Congdon 2015) (see also Dillon 2012 on critical character theory). I intend the 
‘critical’ modifier to pick out approaches to social epistemology that pay attention to the non-ideal aspects of 
epistemic practices, and  the ways in which knowledge-generating practices can be a site for domination. As I 
will use the term, critical social epistemology can and should integrate the concerns of non-critical approaches, 
by combining the concern with traditional epistemic ideals (truth, understanding justification) with attention 
to the ways actual social practices impact the pursuit of those ideals. 
What is a social media site? For the purposes of this essay, I will assume that a social 
media site is one whose primary service is to allow users to hang out, where the 
majority of content shared is generated by those users.2 Many sites which are not 
social media sites host user generated content and are some are used as hang-out 
spaces. We might think of wikipedia, Tinder, and Quora. These sites will not count 
as social media under this definition because their primary service is not to allow 
people to hang out.3 Social media sites are distinctive because they combine a large 
number of active (and often public or semi-public) participants with the kind of 
reliance on personal credibility that would be more normally found in intimate 
private conversations.  
 
In order to avoid a mess of overlapping terminology I will introduce neutral 
termsfor the basic structure of social media sites. I will talk about sites having users 
who will typically have a profile displaying personal information, and be connected 
to various other users either through symmetric or asymmetric relationships. Users 
are able to post content, in the form  of pictures, text, video, or audio, and are also 
able to repost other people’s content. Posts may be public or private, and private posts 
will typically only be accessible to users who are connected to the poster. Most sites 
will combine aspects public and private communications (for example a public 
profile, and private messaging). Sites are organized around a timeline that organizes 
posts from other users, typically using some element of algorithmic sorting to choose 
what content gets presented to which users in which order.  
 
From the point of view of systems-oriented social epistemology, a social media site is 
not merely a piece of communications technology; it is a socio-technical assemblage 
that meshes together a technology with certain communicative affordances, and a set 
of social practices that determine what and how people post and repost content. The 
social practices will be constrained—but not completely determined by—
communications technology, and the effectiveness of technological systems will 
depend on suitable social practices. This meshing means that the epistemic outcomes 
of social media depend on both social and technical features of social media: a social 
media site which allows unlimited reposting might be epistemically disastrous if it is 
combined with reckless social practices for reposting, whereas the same technology 
might be of great value if combined with judicious social practices for reposting. 
Many critical discussions of social media have focused exclusively on one side of this 
complex system. For example, calls for media literacy education focus exclusively on 
social practices, whereas calls to remove the ‘like’ button (or its analogues) focus on 
technological affordances. This is not to say that either intervention is a bad idea, but 
rather that in order to think about the epistemic features of social media we need to 
think about both social and technological features in an integrated way. 
 
2. Critical Social Epistemology 
 
2 For alternative definitions, see (boyd and Ellison 2007), (Sunstein 2017, 22), (Zuckerman and 
Rajendra-Nicolucci 2020). 
3 On the social epistemology of Wikipedia, see (Wray 2009,  and Frost-Arnold 2018). 
 
One place to start thinking about the epistemology of social media is by considering 
what social media sites themselves take their epistemic aims to be. Social media 
sites—especially facebook and twitter—have presented themselves as platforms. 
They exploit the ambiguity of ‘platform’ to present themselves to users as neutral 
platforms for speech while at the same time presenting themselves to companies as 
effective commercial platforms for effective targeted adverts (Gillespie 2010, Srnicek 
2017).4 This rhetorical strategy suggests that social media sites’ explicit epistemic aim 
is to provide users with an online communication system in which all users are 
given equal opportunities (platforms for speech). This aim surfaces in a number of 
different debates about social media: in the way sites appeal to the value of freedom 
of speech to justify not taking action on harmful speech, their repeated claims that 
they are not ‘arbiters of truth’, and in legal debates about the social media sites’ legal 
responsibilities for what users post and repost.5  
 
The presentation of actually existing social media sites as epistemically neutral is 
deeply misleading. Major social media sites have systematically boosted extreme 
content in ways that supports white supremacists and anti-democratic 
propagandists (Tufekci 2018, Munn 2019, Alfano, Carter, Cheong 2018), and 
knowingly boosted unreliable ring-wing news sites in the interests of promoting 
‘trusted’ sites (Oremus 2018, Bauerlein and Jeffery 2020). They have relied on 
problematic and opaque content moderation policies that are implemented by a 
large and outsourced workforce (Roberts 2018, Frost-Arnold forthcoming). Their 
failure to address systematic harassment of women and minority groups has created 
an unequal discursive environment (Sobieraj 2017). Setting to one side failures to 
achieve neutrality, it is unclear that this is even an attractive ideal. One can imagine 
a fastidiously neutral site with very limited content moderation and affordances that 
allow content to quickly spread  that allows a minority of incompetent or malicious 
users to systematically spread false information and derail any attempts at co-
operative inquiry. Such a site might be epistemically and politically neutral, but with 
would be epistemically disastrous. 
 
So, if they ought not to pursue neutrality, what should the epistemic aims of social 
media sites be? We can approach this question through recent research in systems-
oriented social epistemology, which evaluates social systems by considering how well 
they achieve epistemic goals (Goldman 2010). This literature presents us with three 
ways to think about the epistemic aims social institutions: veritism has focused on 
how social institutions affect the accuracy their users’ beliefs (Goldman 2000), 
network epistemology has focused on the epistemic properties of social networks 
(Zollman 2007, 2010, 2013), and work on epistemic  has focused on how social 
institutions undermine peoples’ epistemic agency (Dotson 2014, Fricker 2007), and 
 
4 For a sceptical take on the effectiveness of targeted online advertising, see (Hwang 2020). 
5 The ideal of neutrality might also be deployed against interventions which aim to improve epistemic 
outcomes. For a defence of epistemic paternalism on social media, see (Castro, Pham, Rubel 2020). 
create inverted epistemologies that support domination (Mills 2007).6 Considering 
these approaches together points us toward a unified way of thinking about the 
epistemic goals of social institutions, which combines individualist considerations 
about individual-level epistemic goods, institutionalist considerations about the 
epistemic properties of social networks, and considerations of epistemic justice 
including issues about the distribution of epistemic goods, and the ways epistemic 
systems enact social power.  
 
There is a huge amount of work exemplifying each kind of approach to social 
epistemology, and in the rest of this section, we will introduce some views that 
exemplify each approach to give us the tools we need to think about the social 




Individualistic approaches to social media reduce the epistemic features of a social 
system to the epistemic states of some set of individuals. Most often the relevant 
properties are changes in the epistemic properties of peoples’ beliefs after using that 
social system. So we might evaluate a newspaper by thinking about how it changes 
its readers’ beliefs. Are readers’ beliefs more accurate, more justified, backed by 
better understanding? As will become clear below, individualism has a great deal in 
common with consequentialist approaches in ethics, which evaluate the goodness of 
an action in terms of its consequences for some ethically relevant properties. 
 
The best developed version of Individualism is Alvin Goldman’s veritism (Goldman 
2000). For veritism, the individual states of interest are degrees of belief, and these 
states are better the more accurate they are .We represent true propositions with 1 
and false propositions with 0, and an individual’s degree of belief in some 
proposition with a number in the interval [1,0]. What Goldman calls the fundamental 
veritistic value of a degree of belief is a matter of how close it is to the truth of the 
matter: so if p is true, a degree of belief 1 is maximally accurate, degree 0.9 is less 
accurate and so on (values for false propositions are switched). We give a linear 
measure of the accuracy of beliefs by reading off how close a belief is to the truth of 
the matter (so that credence 0.9 in a true proposition gets a score of 0.9, and a 
credence of 0.2 in a false proposition gets 0.8).7  
 
To think about the epistemic value of social practices, Goldman introduces the 
notion of instrumental veritistic value, which corresponds to how relying on the 
outputs of a social practice effects the average accuracy of individuals’ beliefs. If 
there are three news stories of interest in Tuesday’s paper—A, B, and C—which are 
all accurately reported, then the instrumental veritistic value of reading the paper for 
a credulous reader who started off with a credal profile {0.4, 0.5, 0.6} and ended up 
 
6 The individualist bent of some work on epistemic oppression (Fricker 2007) has been complemented 
by focus on epistemic justice as a virtue of social institutions (Anderson 2012). 
7 To confuse things, Goldman identifies true beliefs with knowledge, but we will not follow this 
convention. 
with {1.0, 1.0, 1.0} would be the average of the change in their credal state (in this 
case +0.5). According to veritism, the epistemic aim of social institutions is to have 
the best possible effects on the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs. Veritism allows us to 
rank the epistemic value of different social practices by ranking their average effects 
on the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs about some set of propositions. This allows us 
to neatly explain why a site that hosts a lot of (believable) false content is 
epistemically bad: individuals who rely allow the site to shape their credences will 
have a lower average instrumental veritistic value than those who rely on other 
belief-forming practices (for example, reading a newspaper, or not reading anything 
at all). 
 
Two clarificatory points. First, Veritism evaluates individual beliefs, meaning that a 
site is only epistemically bad if it hosts false claims that have a negative effect on the 
accuracy of users’ beliefs (either by causing users to form false beliefs, or by causing 
them to move from true belief to suspension). Second, Veritism does not allow us to 
evaluate an epistemic system simply by looking at the number of false stories; we 
need to weigh up true and false stories against one another. Goldman’s view unifies 
the goals of acquiring truth and avoiding error, giving these two goals equal weight. 
We might want to distinguish these two goals, and to assign them different weights.8  
 
Veritisim is an individualist approach because it evaluates social systems by reference 
to individuals’ epistemic states. It is also a consequentialist approach, because it 
evaluates epistemic practices by reference to their consequences. Veritisim is closely 
related to the individualistic thread in social epistemology that takes account of the 
epistemic significance of social factors by considering how social forms of evidence 
(testimony, disagreement, scientific consensus) impinge on individuals’ beliefs 
(Goldman 2010). Other individualist approaches to systems-oriented social 
epistemology are available: we might evaluate social institutions by looking at 
different individual outcomes (justification, rationality, understanding, epistemic 
agency, epistemic virtue), 9 by using a different way to measure accuracy (for 
example, appealing to total accuracy rather than average accuracy), by adding in 
additional measures of value (for example, by measuring the distribution of 
accuracy of beliefs between different people or across different questions (see section 
3.3.)), or by using a different kind of normative framework (for example, by using a 
non-consequentialist value theory).10 Each of these issues is complex, and we will 




8 Goldman implicitly does this in his discussion of the social epistemology of blogging (Goldman 
2008), which appeals exclusively to error avoidance in support of the claim that traditional 
newspapers are epistemically better than blogging (Coady 2011). 
9 The choice between social systems that aim for accuracy or justification is particularly interesting: 
accuracy-focused systems will promote accurate beliefs, whereas justification-focused systems will 
promote both justified true beliefs and justified false beliefs.  
10 The debate about epistemic consequentialism has led to discussions about possible non-
consequentialist views for individual epistemology (Sylvan 2020), but to my knowledge, there are no 
developed non-consequentialist approaches to doing social epistemology. 
 
In addition to thinking about how social practices and institutions effect the 
epistemic states of individuals, we ought to think about the epistemic status of 
group-level properties of social practices and individuals. Institutionalist approaches 
to social epistemology investigate these group-level properties. For example, it 
might be important for us to to think about how reliable or well-justified a scientific 
consensus is. Although the reliability of individual scientists will contribute to the 
reliability of a collective position, results like the Condorcet Jury theorem (List and 
Goodin 2001), and the diversity trumps ability theorem (Hong and Page 2004) mean 
that the reliability of a consensus will not relate in a straightforward way to 
individual reliability.11  
 
The divergences between the epistemic properties of groups and individuals lead to 
what Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks (2011: 654) call the Independence Thesis, the 
claim that  methodological prescriptions for communities and those for individuals 
are logically independent. What might be good advice for a community might be 
bad advice for individuals, and what might be good advice for individuals might be 
bad advice for communities. This independence theorem is central to Institutionalist 
approaches to social epistemology, which focuses on group-level properties as the 
target of epistemic evaluation.  
 
Network epistemology is one kind of institutionalist approach that focuses on the 
epistemic properties of different kinds of communication network (Zollman 2013). 
Research in this field has investigated what communication network leads to the 
most reliable consensus for agents who are engaged in ongoing investigation 
(Zollman 2007, 2010), whether communities of inquirers do better when their 
members follow established results or pursue maverick strategies (Weisberg and 
Muldoon 2009), and how propagandists who selectively share results can undermine 
the reliability of consensus without needing to mislead or produce fraudulent 
research (Weatherall, O’Connor, Bruner 2020, Weatherall and O’Connor 2019). 
Network epistemology uses agent-based modelling and decision theory, and 
typically involves idealising assumptions about agents within these networks.12 
These assumptions open up difficult questions about how these models relate to 




11 The Condorcet jury theorem states that in a group which votes independently and each individual 
is more likely to be right than wrong, the majority position is more likely to be right than wrong, and 
as the size of the group increases the reliability of the consensus swiftly tends toward perfect 
reliability (List and Goodin 2001). The diversity trumps ability theorem states that groups of problem 
solvers with diverse approaches to a problem will outperform less diverse groups with higher 
expertise. In cases where the assumptions of either theorem are met, the reliability of a collective that 
reaches a position either by majoritarian voting or by collective problem-solving will be higher than 
the average reliability of group members (Hong and Page 2004). 
12 Some work in network epistemology takes a less idealised slant, focusing on modelling 
propagandistic strategies (Holman and Bruner 2017, Weatherall, O’Connor, Bruner 2018)) 
Network epistemology investigates certain kinds of institutional properties 
(centrally network structure and inquisitive strategies), and there are many other 
institutionalist approaches that focus on different epistemic properties. For example, 
much feminist work on scientific objectivity would count as a kind of institutionalist 
approach, since it construes objectivity as a collective-level property of a community 
of inquirers (Longino 1990, 2001), and work on judgement aggregation investigates 
the epistemic properties of different kinds of procedures for moving from an 
individual positions to a collective position (List 2005, List and Pettit 2011). There is 
also an important role for thinking about problematic group-level properties like 
polarisation (O’Connor and Weatherall 2017), epistemic bubbles, and echo chambers 
(Nguyen 2020) 
 
2.3. Epistemic Justice 
 
Individualist and Institutionalist approaches focus on articulating good epistemic 
states that ought to be pursued, typically considering idealised social structures. 
Alongside these idealised approaches that focus on characterising epistemic goods, 
it is vital that we take deidealised approaches that consider real-life social systems, 
and characterise the epistemic ills of our quotidian lives.13 In this vein, Kristie Dotson 
(2014) has worked on the ways epistemic practices can undermine individuals’ 
epistemic agency by excluding them from collective knowledge production, 
Miranda Fricker (2007) has investigated how credibility-affecting stereotypes can 
lead to individuals’ testimony being rejected, and Charles Mills (2014, 2017) has 
offered an account of how institutions produce ignorance which supports a white 
supremacist social order.  
 
Generalising a little, work in this tradition investigates both epistemic oppression—
how political and institutional arrangements can undermine and restrict the 
epistemic agency of individuals (especially individuals from oppressed groups)—
and the inverted epistemologies that produce ignorance in order to support oppressive 
social hierarchies.14 
 
There may be a role for individual remedies to ameliorate these ills (Fricker 2007: 
C4), but an important part of the solution to oppressive systems of knowledge 
production will be for institutions and social practices to pursue the collective virtue 
of epistemic justice (Anderson 2012). As I propose to think about things, the 
structural virtue of epistemic justice involves at a minimum  i) respecting the 
epistemic agency of all of its user or members, which may require taking action to 
protect and boost the agency of groups who are targets of epistemic oppression ii) 
ensuring that epistemic goods (such as education, knowledge, and credit) are not 
distributed in unjust ways (Fallis 2004, Coady 2010, 2017), iii) not contributing to (or 
being complicit in) ignorance-producing social practices that support oppressive 
 
13 On ideal and non-ideal theory in epistemology, see (Mckenna forthcoming). 
14 Mills points out that one can think of inverted epistemologies in veritist terms as social processes 
that reliably produce inaccurate beliefs about some subject-matter (Mills 2007). 
social orders. For example, a scientific research group that realises the structural 
property of epistemic justice might respect the agency of its members by ensuring 
that all members can contribute knowledge, that their contributions are recognised 
and given equal credit15, by giving all members some ability to shape the inquisitive 
agenda of the research group, and by avoiding contributing to inverted 
epistemologies by not pursuing research that contributes to racial hierarchies (for 
example by refusing to research facial recognition technologies (Buolamwini and 
Gebru 2018, Crawford and Paglen 2019)). Exactly what kinds of political institutions 
might realise the structural virtue of epistemic justice is  abig question, but we might 
do worse than to follow Anderson’s suggestion of looking towards well-functioning 
deliberative democracy (Anderson 2012 172, see also Anderson 2006). 
 
In contrast to individualism’s consequentialist framework, discussions of epistemic 
justice typically have a non-consequentialist spin, making reference to individuals 
being epistemically wronged (Fricker 2007), to inequalities of epistemic outcomes 
(Fallis 2004, Coady 2010, 2017), and to the role of epistemic systems in supporting 
political oppression (Mills 2007). We will return to this point in section 3.3. 
 
3. Individualism, Institutionalism, and Epistemic Justice Involve Competing 
Goals 
 
If social systems ought to promote the epistemic goals of individual epistemic goods, 
valuable institutional properties, and structural epistemic virtue, we might ask how 
these goals relate to one another. Is the pursuit of these different goals mutually 
supportive, or are there cases where pursuing one of the goals undermines the 
pursuit of another? In this section I will show that the pursuit of individual 
epistemic goods, good epistemic structures, and epistemic justice are in tension, 
creating three dilemmas for the critical epistemologist.  
 
3.1. Individualism and Institutionalism 
 
The independence thesis (Mayo-Wilson, Danks, Zollman 2011) states that the goals 
of good epistemic outcomes for individuals and valuable group-level properties can 
come apart.16  To get a grip on some of the cases in which individual and collective 
outcomes come apart, let’s consider the Zollman effect, and the social dilemmas that 
emerge with information cascades. 
 
In a series of papers, Kevin Zollman has used agent-based modelling to explore the 
epistemic properties of different kinds of communication networks (Zollman 2007, 
2010). Zollman considers the following situation: a group is gathering probabilistic 
 
15 See (Shapin 1989) on the way the contributions of technicians are obscured and (Merton [and 
Zuckerman] 1968) on the way credit can be unjustly distributed according to reputation. 
16 (Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, and Danks 2010, 2013) discuss versions of the independence theorem 
relating to choice of optimal strategies of inquiry, whereas we are interested in what kinds of social 
networks are better for individuals or for groups. For discussion of the relation between the 
evaluation of individuals and social groups, see (Bishop 2005), (Smart 2018), (Levy and Alfano 2020). 
evidence about a question, which they have to act on in a series of tests where in 
each test they will apply the option they think is most likely to be successfully. One 
might think of medical researchers who are deciding whether to use a new treatment 
where the researchers engage in rounds of treatment where they decide to use the 
old or new treatment, and afterwards share results with some of their colleagues. 
The members of the group are connected by symmetric relations that allow them to 
share their results, and they update their beliefs about which option is better by 
applying Bayes’ rule to their and their neighbours’ results. Using computer 
modelling to simulate these networks, Zollman found that the degree of connectivity 
in the network creates a trade-off between the speed with which consensus is 
reached, and the reliability of this consensus. More connected networks (like the 
fully connected network on the right in figure 1) reach a consensus answer more 
quickly than less connected networks (like the wheel on the left), but are less reliable 
at reaching the correct result.17 
 
 
Fig 1. A cycle, wheel, and fully connected social networks (from Zollman 2007 p 579). 
 
Zollman’s gloss on this result is that more connected networks are less reliable 
because they are more likely to reach a preemptive consensus based on a stretch of 
misleading evidence. This result demonstrates the epistemic importance of transient 
diversity (temporary disagreement), which slows down the process of reaching 
consensus enough that inquirers collect enough evidence to form a reliable 
consensus (Zollman 2010). This result illustrates the independence theorem because 
what is better for individuals (having more connections and hence more evidence) is 
worse for the collective (because more connections lead to less reliable results).  
 
A social dilemma occurs when what it is epistemically best for each individual to 
take one option, but every individual taking that option creates a worse outcome for 
the group.18 There are various candidates for epistemic versions of social dilemmas. 
Kummerfeld and Zollman (2015) show that social dilemmas can occur for the choice 
of strategies of inquiry, creating situations in which it is better for individuals to 
pursue conservative strategies, and better for the group to include at least some risk-
 
17 Some caveats: this result appears to only hold up in certain kinds of difficult problem situations 
(Rosenstock, Bruner, O’Connor 2017), and there are general reasons to take modelling results as 
hypothesis-generating for normative advice (Frey and Šešelja 2018). 
18 The possibility that information cascades involve free-rider dynamics was first noted by (Banarjee 
1992, 816), and is explored by (List and Pettit 2004), and (Dunn 2018) (who argues that these 
situations ought not to be described as social dilemmas). 
takers.19 The literature on information cascades provides another kind of social 
dilemma where the choice for individuals is how many other people to be connected 
to.20 Consider a model where a group is deciding on a binary factual question by 
majority vote. Each individual starts with the same prior belief, and then receives 
different evidence which is equally likely to be correct. They update on this evidence 
via Bayesian reasoning to reach a view about the probable answer to the question, 
and express this credence by voting for the option they think is most likely. Each 
individual desires that their own vote is correct. If none of the individuals in the 
model are connected, we meet the assumptions of the Condorcet Jury theorem and 
the majority position will be more reliable than the average accuracy of individuals 
within the group. However, if we take the same model and introduce social learning 
where individuals can share their votes, things look rather different. In a roll-call 
situation in which individuals vote in sequence, and each individual can see all of 
the prior votes, the group faces the threat of information cascades. If the first two 
voters have received evidence that favours option A, then even if the third voter has 
evidence that favours B, she will vote for A because the evidence from their peers 
outweighs their private evidence. In the roll-call situation the group’s position an be 
determined by the luck of who gets to vote first, not by the aggregate of the group’s 
evidence. In the roll-call setting, groups will systematically under-perform the 
unconnected groups. The choice between the unconnected and roll-call scenarios 
leads to a social dilemma: individuals will want to be in the roll-call scenario since 
being able to see previous votes increases their chances of voting correctly, but as the 
group becomes more connected its performance will degrade due to the increased 
chance of information cascades, meaning that everyone is worse off. This dilemma 
generalises: for models with intermediate levels of connection, the more connected 
the groups, the more reliable individuals are, and the less reliable the collective 
position is (Zollman forthcoming). 
 
We’ve illustrated the possibility of social dilemmas using a mathematical model, and 
it might be that other factors complicate the picture for real-life groups. However, 
given the empirical evidence for information cascades,21 and jury-theorem-type 
results22, we ought to take the social dilemmas seriously, in social groups in general, 
and with social media platforms in particular. The important upshot for critical 
social epistemology is that when we design social systems with epistemic goals in 
mind, in some cases we will have to choose between promoting the epistemic states 
of individuals, and the epistemic states of the system considered as a collective 
entity. 
 
3.2. Institutionalism and Epistemic Justice 
 
19 See (Dunn 2018) for a different kind of social dilemma involving conciliatory and steadfast 
responses to disagreement. 
20 In this paragraph and the next, I am drawing heavily on (Zollman MS, chapter 3). For a discussion 
of online information cascades, see (Sunstein 2017 C4). 
21 (Anderson and Holt 1997, Hung and Plott 2001, Kübler and Weizsäcker 2005, Ziegelmeyer et al 
2010) 
22 (Miller 1996) 
 
Let’s now turn to consider the relation between institutional epistemic properties 
and epistemic justice. Here the conflict emerges because the ideally best institutional 
arrangements may not be the best response to non-ideal conditions. This point is a 
cousin of the problem of the second-best in economics: in non-ideal political 
conditions, trying to approximate the epistemically ideal institutional structures may 
lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
 
Nancy Fraser’s critique of the Habermasian public sphere tradition in political 
theory presents us with a clear example of the problems with pursuing ideal 
epistemic structures in non-ideal situations (Fraser 1990). The public sphere tradition 
claims that the ideal for liberal democratic societies is a unified public sphere: an 
open forum for debate in which all citizens discuss issues of public concern on equal 
footing, bracketing their social power. Habermas’s hope is that an open public 
sphere allows the unforced force of the better argument to determine the course of 
collective political action. The public sphere is a political ideal, concerned with the 
legitimate grounds of political authority, but it is also an epistemic ideal, concerned 
with the institutions that support the application of collective intelligence to political 
problems.  
 
Fraser charges Habermas with the characteristic intellectual vice of ideal theorists 
(Mills 2005): reading their view of the ideal into their description of social reality. 
Drawing on revisionist histories of public discourse, she points out that Habermas’ 
description of the bourgeois public sphere fails to reckon with the exclusionary 
aspects of the public sphere in actually existing democracy, leading him to overlook 
alternative discursive arenas in which marginalised groups organised to discuss and 
articulate issues of specific concern to these groups.23 Fraser discusses a number of 
formal and informal barriers to participation in the public sphere, including 
restrictive conceptualisations of the political, discursive inequalities, and conceptual 
lacunae for expressing thoughts.24 Although she doesn’t put it in these terms, her 
central point is that in conditions on substantial epistemic oppression, a unified 
public sphere will compound prior political inequalities. This public sphere might be 
a laudable epistemic ideal for societies that have already achieved a substantial 
degree of political equality (although, see Fraser 1990, 68-69 on non-epistemic 
reasons for publics in egalitarian societies), but it is not an useful epistemic ideal for 
non-ideal political circumstances. The failure of the public sphere is both political—
because it will not ameliorate political inequalities—and epistemic—because 
discourse in conditions of epistemic oppression, the public will fail to act on the 
political knowledge of people from subordinated social groups. 
 
23 Fraser draws from feminist organizing, and Squires (2006) broadens the scope to articulate the 
Black American tradition as a series of different kinds of counterpublics. 
24 Fraser is writing nearly twenty years before the mainstream literature on epistemic injustice but 
anticipating several of the central themes of Fricker (2007). Of course, work on epistemic oppression 
in Black Feminism antedates Fraser by at least a hundred years, and has been ignored by white 
feminists (Dotson 2012, Berenstain 2020). On Fraser’s failure to deal with black counterpublics and for 
a more detailed typology of subaltern public spheres, see (Squires 2006). 
 
Fraser contends that in non-ideal circumstances the epistemic ideal is precisely the 
subaltern counterpublic spheres which are overlooked by the public sphere 
tradition. In a well-functioning counterpublic, members of a marginalised group 
organise together to discuss issues of common concern which have been shunted out 
of the ‘public’ domain, developing the conceptual and epistemic resources that they 
need to express their concerns, contesting mainstream interpretations of their 
identities, and articulating the knowledge available from their social position. 
Although they are semi-public spaces of refuge, counterpublics are not enclaves (at 
least not by choice). The aim of a properly functioning counterpublic is to influence 
the public sphere by ensuring uptake for conceptual and epistemic resources. 
 
There are two lessons here. First, that the goodness of epistemic systems needs to be 
evaluated relative to real-world conditions. Second, that mechanisms which are 
epistemically good in ideal conditions can become mechanisms of epistemic 
oppression in non-ideal conditions. This doesn’t necessarily mean that institutional 
arrangements ought to be rejected because of their oppressive character (sometimes 
oppression is unavoidable, and sometimes it can be justified by appeal  to other 
goods), but in order to properly evaluate epistemic systems we need to take 
epistemic oppression into consideration. 
 
3.3. Individualism and Epistemic Justice 
 
Individualism and epistemic justice come into conflict because as we noted above 
individualism presupposes a kind of consequentialism that is blind to epistemic 
oppression. Individualistic consequentialist approaches like veritism flatten out 
differences between different people and different questions and ignores important 
constraints on the pursuit of epistemic goods.25  By contrast, the ideal of epistemic 
justice require us to think about the distribution of epistemic goods between 
different people and different questions, and how respect for peoples’ epistemic 
agency might constrain the pursuit of epistemic goods. Just as consequentialism in 
the ethical domain fails to account for issues about the distribution of moral goods, 
and struggles to account for side-constraints  to the pursuit of good outcomes, 
consequentialism in the epistemic domain fails to account for issues about the 
distribution of epistemic goods, and struggles to deal with side-constraints to the 
pursuit of epistemic goods. In the interests of simplicity, we will focus on how 
distributional and rights-based issues show up for veritism, but similar points could 
be made about other individualist approaches. 
 
Don Fallis (2004), and David Coady (2010, 2017) have argued that Goldman’s 
veritism fails to account the importance of distributions of epistemic outcomes 
between individuals. To get a grip on how distributional issues can emerge in 
epistemology, consider a toy example. Imagine two secondary school systems: 
system A assigns students to four schools based on location, and divides up its 
 
25 But see footnote 4. 
funding equally, whereas system B assigns students to schools based on their 
performance in an entrance exam, and gives the ‘high-performing’ school half of its 
funding. The mixing of students in system A means that students in all schools gain 
reasonable increases to accuracy (in the range of +0.1 to +0.3), whereas the streaming 
in system B means that the students in the ‘high performance’ school gain huge 
increases to accuracy (+0.9), whereas the students in the ‘low performance’ school 
have less accurate beliefs when they leave the school (-0.1). On graduation, the 
students at each of the eight schools have the following average instrumental 
veritistic values with respect to the questions in the school curriculum: 
 
System A Instrumental 
Veritistic value 
System B Instrumental 
Veritistic value 
A1 +0.2 B1 +0.9 
A2 +0.3 B2 +0.3 
A3 +0.1 B3 +0.1 
A4 +0.2 B4 -0.1 
Average accuracy +0.2 Average accuracy  +0.3 
 
Although system B has a negative effect on the students in its ‘low-performance’ 
school (B4), it is outweighed by the extremely effective education it delivers in the 
‘high-performing’ school (B1). Because veritism evaluates based on a mean average, 
without paying any attention to the distribution of accuracy, it ranks system B as 
better than system A.26 There is perhaps a sense in which school system B is better 
(just as an unequal society with high average welfare is in some sense better than a 
more equal society with lower average welfare) but system B is considerably worse 
from the perspective of political equality and epistemic justice.27 
 
Fallis (2004) and Coady (2010, 2017) suggest that veritism ought to take account of 
the way changes in accuracy (Goldman’s instrumental epistemic value) are 
distributed between agents. There are several different ways to represent the 
importance of distributional considerations: a strict egalitarian position would 
require the most equal distribution of veritistic value, a prioritarian position would 
require maximising the veritistic value of the least accurate agents, a sufficientarian 
position would require getting all agents above a threshold of accuracy, and an 
epistemic version of the difference principle would require maximising the veritistic 
value of the worst off.28 Evaluating these options is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but we can assume that some kind of distributional consideration will matter for 
epistemic justice (Anderson 2012). 
 
26 We could get similar results if we switched to consider total veritistic value. 
27 Are constraints of epistemic equality generated by epistemic or ethical considerations? Following 
Fricker (2007), philosophers have situated epistemic justice in a liminal zone that overlaps epistemic 
and ethical considerations. If it turned out that epistemic justice was an purely an issue for ethics or 
politics, these conflicts would no longer be epistemic dilemmas, but they would remain dilemmas. 
28 To complicate things, several of these positions can be applied either to fundamental or 
instrumental veritistic value: strict egalitarianism might aim to ensure everyone’s credences are 
equally accurate (fundamental value), or it might aim to equally distribute increases in accuracy 
(instrumental value). 
 
Similar distributional issues emerge when we consider accuracy with respect to 
different questions. Consider two possible ways to teach the history of the United 
Kingdom: curriculum A is extremely accurate about medieval history, and the 
second world war, but doesn’t cover the imperial history of Britain, and curriculum 
B covers all three issues with a reasonable but lower average accuracy. Veritism 
claims that curriculum A is better, but if we are interested in distributing knowledge 
about different subject-matters equally, curriculum B might be better. Considering 
active ignorance can also show us how inaccuracy on certain questions can 
exemplify epistemic oppression. Curriculum B’s silence on British Imperial history 
would plausibly be part of the system of white ignorance that is endemic in the 
British education system (Bain 2018). 
 
Individualism also faces problems dealing with side-constraints to the pursuit of 
epistemic goods. Structural epistemic justice requires respecting the epistemic 
agency of inquirers, generating a right on the part of individuals to participate in 
collective knowledge-production. This requirement can conflict with the goal of 
maximising average accuracy (or other epistemic goods). One way to ensure that an 
epistemic practice has higher average veritistic value is to stop people from 
participating in that practice if their participation will lower the average accuracy. 
Another toy example: we are in charge of a community debate group, and we are 
interested in increasing the veritistic value of that group. There are lots of benign 
ways to increase average accuracy: we might introduce debate rules, giving out a 
precis of research on the discussion topics. However, if including members of a 
minority group in discussions leads to other participants sharing persuasive 
misinformation about that group, one way in which we could increase accuracy 
would be to exclude the minority group from discussion. Exclusion from collective 
inquiry is not always significant—it’s not a big deal if I am excluded from a private 
discord group about the best Buffy episode—but systemic exclusion from collective 
knowledge production does constitute an important infringement of epistemic 
agency.  
 
The conflict between the consequentialist axiology of individualism and the 
egalitarian and rights-based aspects of epistemic justice demonstrates that the 
systems-oriented social epistemologist needs to pay attention not only to the amount 
of epistemic goods generated by social systems, but also to the way those goods are 
distributed between people and questions, and to the basic rights to participate in 
collective knowledge-production. Although I have presented examples that broke in 
favour of epistemic justice, in other cases maximising individual epistemic interests 
may win out. If the sole means of pursuing substantial epistemic improvement for 
individuals is to undermine the epistemic agency of a small group who are not 
otherwise marginalised, considerations of epistemic justice might be overridden by 
the epistemic interests of the majority.  
 
3.4. Epistemic Dilemmas?  
 
The conflicts between the epistemic goals associated with individualism, 
institutionalism, and epistemic justice might be taken as a reductio of the view that 
institutions ought to aim at all three epistemic goals. At least at first pass, this 
objection is not convincing: these dilemmas instantiate general tensions in normative 
theory: i) between individual goods and collective goods, ii) between social 
arrangements in ideal and non-ideal situations, and iii) between consequentialism 
and constraints on the pursuit of maximising goods. The tensions we find here in the 
domain of epistemology are examples of much more general normative tensions. 
 
One might take these tensions as evidence that social epistemology involves an 
element of non-rational choice between competing values. This inference is too 
quick. While these tensions cannot be resolved by appealing to epistemic values, we 
can appeal to extra-epistemic considerations – for example to ethical considerations. 
We should prioritise institutional epistemic goods over individual epistemic 
outcomes when the institutional epistemic outcomes are ethically important. For 
example, having an accurate predictions of climate change is extremely morally 
important, so there might be a good case for limiting communication amongst 
climate researchers if doing so would increase the accuracy of the consensus 
prediction. Similarly, applying ideal practices to a non-ideal situation is bad, when 
the bad epistemic outcomes are also ethically problematic, and the ethical-epistemic 
character of epistemic justice means that exclusions from collective knowledge-
production, and unequal distributions of epistemic goods are bad (in part) because 
they are ethically bad. 
 
I am not suggesting that epistemic value reduces to ethical value, but rather that 
ethical considerations can provide us with balancing considerations to resolve some 
epistemic dilemmas. Some epistemic dilemmas may not have an ethical dimension: 
whether we prioritise individual or collective epistemic outcomes regarding trivial 
questions is ethically unimportant. In these cases I think we should fall back on 
incommensurability, and accept that there is not rational way to resolve these 
choices. Appealing to moral considerations is not a simple way out of these 
epistemic dilemmas, but it makes clear what kind of choice we are dealing with. 
 
4. The Social Epistemology of Social Media 
 
Our discussion of the epistemic goals of social systems suggests that the epistemic 
evaluation of social systems involves a trio of epistemic dilemmas in which we 
weigh up the value of individual outcomes, institution-level properties, and 
structural epistemic justice. The dilemmas between these three values cannot be 


























Figure 2: the Epistemic goals of social institutions. 
 
With this picture of the epistemic aims of social institutions in place, we can consider 
how these goals and the tensions between them can help us to illuminate debates 
about the epistemology of social media. I will do this in two stages: first showing 
how discussions of the epistemology of social media appeal to these different 
epistemic aims (4.1), and secondly demonstrating how the tensions between these 
aims can illuminate some of the dilemmas involved in designing social media (4.2). 
 
4.1. Individualism, Institutionalism, and Epistemic Justice 
 
First, we will consider some debates about the design of social media that 
demonstrate that concerns about individual epistemic goods, collective epistemic 
virtue, and structural epistemic justice play a role in debates about how to design 
social media. These examples are picked because they are neat examples of appeals 
to different kinds of values, and because they help to illustrate the conflicts between 




Many changes to the rules and functionality of social media sites make appeals to 
individual epistemic goods.29 We will consider two examples: Facebook’s changes to 
the newsfeed in April 2019 to reduce the amount of ‘false news’, and Twitter’s 
changes to the retweet function in October 2019. 
 
In a press release from April 2019, Facebook announced a slew of changes to the 
platform that were designed “to fight false news”.30 These changes included: 
exploring the possibility of crowdsourced fact-checking, expanding the role of the 
associated press in fact-checking stories, reducing the reach of Facebook Groups that 
repeatedly share false stories, and incorporating a ‘Click-Gap’ signal into the 
newsfeed algorithm which promises to reduce the reach of domains which are more 
linked on Facebook than they are on the rest of the Internet. None of these 
 
29 (Silverman 2019), (Rosen and Lyons 2019). 
30 Facebook has a policy of using ‘false news’ as an umbrella term and avoiding ‘fake news’, but news 





Problem of the 
second-best 
interventions involve straightforwardly removing false content—a politically dicey 
proposal given right-wing concerns about social media censorship—rather they are 
designed to reduce the impact of false stories on Facebook users. Setting to one side 
blustering rhetoric about ‘fighting’ misinformation, the substance of this proposal is 
to implement changes to the newsfeed algorithm that demote certain groups and 
domains, in order to reduce the amount of false claims that show up on the 
newsfeed, with the proximal aim of ensuring that people who use Facebook come 
away with fewer false beliefs. Here Facebook is presupposing a kind of error-
avoiding veritism according to which social media platforms are better, the less 
inaccurate they make their users’ beliefs. It’s important to remind ourselves that a 
developed veritist framework will consider both avoiding error and possessing the 
truth. A more consistent application of veritism would also consider what affects 
these changes have on the amount of true beliefs that people come away from 
Facebook with. 
 
Social media companies are interested in other individual epistemic outcomes 
besides the accuracy of users’ beliefs. In October 2019, as part of its preparations for 
the US election, Twitter announced changes to the how users could repost other 
posts. At this point, Twitter users could click the retweet button and choose to 
retweet without comment, or quote tweet with a prefatory message. In order to 
encourage more ‘thoughtful amplification’, the retweet function was changed so that 
pressing the retweet button led straight to the quote tweet screen (although it was 
still possible to retweet without a comment by leaving the text box empty). The hope 
was that by adding a nudge that added friction to retweeting would encourage users 
to add their own commentary, in order to “increase the likelihood that people add 
their “own thoughts, reactions and perspectives to the conversation..”31 This change 
was reversed in December 2020. In a blogpost, twitter employees report that “we 
observed that prompting Quote Tweets didn’t appear to increase context: 45% of 
additional Quote Tweets included just a single word and 70% contained less than 25 
characters.”32 We can see this change as motivated by an individualistic interest in 
users making more justified contributions to conversation. By adding friction into 
the retweet function, twitter users were discouraged from quick and unjustified 
retweets, and were encouraged to take a second to think about retweeting by adding 
supporting (or rebutting) reasons to the claim that they were retweeting.33 This 
example highlights the fact that although veritisitic concerns are central to 
individualism, individualists can be interested in other epistemic goods besides 






31 (Gadde and Beykpour 2020a) 
32 (Gadde and Beykpour 2020b) 
33 Although it is tempting to assimilate retweeting to assertion (Rini 2017), retweeting appears to be a 
distinct speech act that only sometimes involves indirect endorsement of the embedded claim (Marsili 
2019), (Pepp, Michaelson, Sterken forthcoming). 
Alongside concerns for individual epistemic goods, discussions of social media 
demonstrate concerns with institutional epistemic properties. We will focus on two 
particularly clear examples of institutional epistemic goods: Cass Sunstein’s view 
that the ideal for social media is a unified public sphere, and Facebook’s appeal to 
the value of connectedness.34 
 
In a series of remixes of his book Republic.com (Sunstein 2001, 2007, 2017), Cass 
Sunstein raises worries about the ways in which a information technologies that 
involve ‘filtering’ information creates a fractured public sphere that undermines the 
epistemic workings of deliberative democracy. In Republic.com from 2001 his focus 
was on personalised news and niche websites. By 2007, Republic.com 2.0 changed 
focus to blogs, and 2017’s #Republic was squarely focused on social media.  
 
In Sunstein’s view, a well-functioning deliberative democracy requires supporting 
institutions; general-interest venues for disseminating information that establish a 
common ground of accepted beliefs and enable the serendipitous discovery of novel 
views. His concern is that information technologies that allow for personalised 
filtering herald the death of these institutions (he vacillates between concerns with 
current technologies, and worries about future developments). He worries that a 
media system organised around our interests as consumers will focus people’s 
attention on special-interest forums, undermining the common ground through the 
filtering of information through search engines, hashtag-based social media, and 
personalised newsfeeds and replacing them with partisan news sources, and 
individualised information diets. Sunstein argues that this fragmentation of our 
epistemic landscape leads to a number of problems, including echo chambers, group 
polarisation, persistent false beliefs, cybercascades, a lack of shared experiences, and 
violent extremism. He canvasses a number of policy proposals for the internet  
including websites designed for civil deliberation, subsidies for public internet 
websites, encouraging viewpoint diversity on partisan websites, and ‘opposing 
viewpoint’ and ‘serendipity’ buttons for social media sites (Sunstein 2017: 213-233) . 
 
Sunstein situates his work in a Republican tradition of American legal scholarship 
that grounds the value of free expression in the epistemic value of public discourse, 
but there is a strongly Habermasian flavour to Sunstein’s critique (2017 46-7, 153-5, 
see also (Habermas 2006 fn3)). Like Habermas, Sunstein claims that the ideal for a 
deliberative democracy is a unified public sphere in which all citizens participate on 
a relatively equal footing, have shared experiences that support a common ground 
of beliefs, and citizens have chance encounters with a wide range of fellow citizens 
with different views.35 From this perspective, the problem with special-interest 
websites, blogs, and social media is that they lead to a fractured public sphere—or 
perhaps a networked set of distinct public spheres (boyd 2010)—that undermine 
collective democratic problem-solving. Sunstein’s critique of the contemporary 
 
34 For a book that applies tools from network epistemology to problems around misinformation, see (O’Connor 
and Weatherall 2019, especially chapter4). 
35 In other work, Sunstein has criticized Habermas, arguing that prediction markets are preferable to 
democratic deliberation (Sunstein 2006). 
internet is robustly institutionalist. He frames his topic in with concerns about the 
availability of public space on the internet, and his central question is “what are the 
social preconditions of a well-functioning system of democratic deliberation? 
(Sunstein 2017, 5). 
 
Institutional epistemic features also play a role in how social media companies 
present themselves to the public. Since at least 2010 Facebook has presented itself as 
promoting the social purpose of connecting users (van Dijck 2013). Here’s Mark 
Zuckerberg’s celebrating Facebook reaching two billion users in 2015: 
 
I'm so proud of our community for the progress we've made. Our community 
stands for giving every person a voice, for promoting understanding and for 
including everyone in the opportunities of our modern world. A more open 
and connected world is a better world. It brings stronger relationships with 
those you love, a stronger economy with more opportunities, and a stronger 
society that reflects all of our values.36 
 
In this passage, Zuckerberg highlights the political and epistemic benefits of 
connectivity, for both individuals and societies. Over the years, Facebook’s use of 
‘connectivity’ has acquired an expansive set of associations, referring to many 
people are using Facebook, projects to provide free internet access, and a sense of 
social closeness. However, appeals to the value of connecting each user to a large 
number of other users remains central.37 In a post from 2017 entitled Bringing the 
World Closer Together, Zuckerberg presents Facebook’s history as centred around 
connectedness: 
 
I started Facebook to connect my college. I always thought one day someone 
would connect the whole world, but I never thought it would be us. I would 
have settled for connecting my whole dorm. We were just college kids. But 
we cared so much about this idea -- that all people want to connect. So we just 
kept pushing forward, day by day, just like you.38 
 
It is no accident that Facebook is designed for users to become highly connected. José 
van Dijck argues that Facebook’s rhetoric of social connectedness belies their 
connectivity-centred economic model (van Dijck 2013, see also Zuboff 2019). By 
designing a platform that incentivises users to connect with many others, along with 
features like the ‘like’ button which tracks users across the rest of the internet, 
 
36  (Zuckerberg 2015)  
37 In a memo from 2016, Facebook executive Andrew Bosworth claimed that connectedness was a 
fundamental value for Facebook, and appeared to present connectedness as a fundamental moral 
value: 
The ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us 
to connect more people more often is *de facto* good. It is perhaps the only area where the 
metrics do tell the true story as far as we are concerned […]It is literally just what we do. We 
connect people. Period. (quoted in Mac, Warzel, Kantrowitz 2018) 
 
38 (Zuckerberg 2017) 
Facebook is able to harvest more information about their users, which it can use to 
offer its customers highly targeted adverts. 
 
Notwithstanding Facebook’s commercial interest in a highly connected userbase, 
there is a substantive issue for epistemologists: is a highly connected group of people 
an epistemically virtuous social structure?39 Zuckerberg suggests that highly 
connected groups promote ‘understanding’, and a stronger society, but as we shall 
see below (in section 4.2.1.), connectedness raises difficult issues about the relation 
between individual and collective epistemic value.  
 
4.1.3. Epistemic Justice 
 
In section 2.3., we distinguished three issues that come under the heading of 
epistemic justice: inverted epistemologies that produce politically-charged 
ignorance, issues of epistemic oppression, wherein people are undermined in their 
capacities as knowers and inquirers, and issues about the distribution of epistemic 
goods. Social media sites are socio-technical assemblages that combine technological 
systems with social practices, and that issues of epistemic justice show up both in the 
social and technological sites of these systems. In thinking about social and 
algorithmic oppression that occurs through social media sites, we should draw on 
the rich thread of work that uses an intersectional lens to explore the ways that other 
kinds of technological systems perpetuate both material and epistemic oppression.40 
 
Starting with inverted epistemologies, we have an embarrassment of examples of 
social media sites abetting inverted epistemologies, both by permitting certain kinds 
of organising, and by providing the technological basis of white ignorance. As Safiya 
Noble points out in the epilogue of Algorithms of Oppression (Noble 2018), a 
significant part of the issue of misinformation—which is often ignored in discussions 
of ‘fake news’—concerns technologically-abetted ignorance about marginalised 
groups. If sites fail to moderate racist hate speech (as the majority of social media 
companies have), they are effectively providing an organising service for white 
supremacists who have a history of being ‘innovation opportunists’ (Daniels 2009, 
2018). White supremacist organising on social media is not merely permitted, but 
tacitly abetted by algorithmic systems which appear to promote racialised ignorance. 
For example, it has been suggested YouTube (which for our purposes can count as a 
social media site) has a bias towards ‘extreme’ content, creating a situation in which 
the recommended videos for fairly banal videos will quickly lead users down a 
pipeline of increasingly white supremacist content (Tufekci 2018, Alfano, Carter, and 
Cheong 2018, Munn 2019). If social media sites are designed for algorithmic self-
 
39 There is an open question about how connected Facebook actually is, since the algorithmic timeline 
means that many Facebook users only see posts from a minority of people they are connected to. 
40 For example, work on technological redlining in search (Noble 2018), connections between 
technology and the carceral state (Benjamin 2019), inverted epistemologies in facial recognition 
(Boulamwani and Gebru 2018, Crawford and Pagin 2019). 
radicalisation, the technologies undergirding social media are complicit in the 
inverted epistemology of white supremacy.41 
 
Turning to epistemic oppression, we find no shortage of examples of marginalised 
groups on social media having their capacity to contribute to inquiry being 
undermined. Social media companies permit significant amounts of online 
harassment, which has disproportionate harms on women, especially women of 
colour, lesbian women, and trans women.42 Sarah Sobieraj argues that the online 
harassment of women should be understood as “patterned resistance to women’s 
public voice” (2018, 1701). She argues that this resistance employs common 
misogynistic strategies of intimidation, shaming, and discrediting that make 
gender—and in particular women’s bodies—salient in online spaces.43 She argues 
that the cumulative effect of misogynistic harassment is to “silence women, 
undermine their contributions to digital discourse, press them out of valued digital 
publics, and create a climate of self-censorship that mirrors the calculations women 
make in physical public spaces about what is safe and what is risky.”(Sobieraj 2018 
1709-10). In the jargon of epistemic justice, we can say that social media platforms 
are sites of epistemic oppression, and suggest that a significant proportion of the 
responsibility accrues to the companies who have failed to moderate harassment. 
Given the prevalence of technological redlining (Noble 2018) in other algorithmic 
systems, it would be no surprise to find that the algorithmic systems that sort 
timelines, suggest connections, and contribute to content moderation further 
undermine the epistemic agency of marginalised groups. For example automated 
systems for detecting hate speech produce high rates of false positives when used on 
African American Vernacular English (AAVE) (Sap et al 2019). These errors seem to 
emerge because the datasets used to train these systems incorrectly identified 
linguistic markers of AAVE as hate speech (Sap et al 2019, Davidson, Bhattacharya, 
and Weber 2019, Kim et al 2020).  
 
We have only scratched the surface of the inverted epistemologies and epistemic 
oppression on social media, but these example hopefully indicate that achieving 
structural epistemic justice is a substantive challenge for social media, and that an 
important part of existing critiques of social media platforms is that they abet and 
enact epistemic oppression and inverted epistemologies. 
 
4.2. Conflicts between Epistemic Aims in Social Media Platforms 
 
4.2.1. The Independence theorem 
 
In section 3.1., we saw that the independence theorem means that the 
methodological prescriptions and groups can come apart, and used two models to 
 
41 For an alternative take that stresses the role of social networks in radicalization, see (Lewis 2018).  
42 For an overview of statistics on online harassment in the united states, see 
https://www.womensmediacenter.com/speech-project/research-statistics 
43 Sobieraj focuses on the strategies of misogyny, but there will be further stories to be told about misogynoir 
and transmisogyny. 
illustrate the idea that highly connected networks can be good for individuals, but 
bad for collective-level performance. We shouldn’t mistake mathematical models for 
reality, but I think that there are fairly good reasons to think that currently existing 
social media sites instantiate this dilemma, in the sense that social media networks 
are good for individual epistemic outcomes, but bad for collective-level epistemic 
performance. 
 
We saw in section 4.1.2. that Facebook presents  itself as motivated by the desire to 
promote connectedness amongst its users, but at least involves providing each user 
with connections to many other users. This feature serves the commercial aim of 
extracting the maximum amount of behavioural data from users, but it also has 
epistemic virtues. In a highly connected network, individuals have access to a 
greater amount of information, can expect to hear of interesting news in a timely 
manner, and will be able to make use of coverage-supported reasoning (see 
Goldberg 2010 C6). However, the fact that highly connected networks provide 
epistemic goods for individuals does not mean that they are without problems at the 
institutional level. In the models from section 3.1., we saw that highly connected 
networks can reach consensus too quickly, and lose reliability due to informational 
cascades. This might lead us to speculate that part of the reason why highly 
connected social media sites like Facebook and Twitter remain popular despite their 
well-known epistemic ills is that they trade off individual epistemic goods, against 
our collective epistemic interest. We gain fast and reliable information about what 
our friends are up to, and about breaking news, but at the cost of information 
cascades and false but surprising stories spreading quickly across closely connected 
networks.44 
 
We would need much more evidence from both modelling and social science to back 
up the suggestion that highly connected social media networks are good for 
individuals, but there is something appealing about this suggestion. By the time of 
writing it is widely accepted that social media have serious epistemic problems. 
Given this fact, why do so many people continue to use social media sites? Although 
there may be some mileage in explanations that appeal to addiction or irrationality, 
our more charitable suggestion is that individuals who are using highly connected 
social media sites are trading off the collective epistemic good against their own 
epistemic advantage. 
 
4.2.2. The problem of the second-best 
 
The conflict between designing social media for collective epistemic virtue and for 
structural epistemic justice shows up in debates about the online public sphere. We 
 
44 We can also find examples of the reverse of this tradeoff. The best candidates for sites that 
take advantage of the Condorcet Jury theorem are prediction markets and betting 
exchanges. While the outputs of prediction markets might be more reliable than the average 
user, these sites allow very restricted (or no) communication between users to ensure that 
bets are made as independently as possible, meaning that their collective performance 
comes at the cost of restricting individual-level evidence. 
saw in section 4.1.2. that Sunstein suggests that the ideal for social media in a 
deliberative democracy is a unified public sphere in which citizens shared a common 
ground of accepted beliefs, and are exposed to an overlapping range of perspectives. 
The unified public sphere might be a good ideal for a society that has already 
achieved conditions of structural epistemic justice. But, as Fraser points out (see 3.2), 
in actually existing societies which are characterised by endemic exclusion and 
silencing in the public sphere, a unified public sphere would only compound 
epistemic oppression (see (Soberiaj 2018) for a version of this point). Applying 
Fraser’s analysis to online discourse, we might suggest that for societies 
characterised by epistemic oppression, the proper ideal is not a unified public sphere 
realised by one social media site, but rather a network of counterpublic spheres 
representing an overlapping set of groups’ interests.45 Designing sites to cultivate a 
unified public sphere might promote the collective epistemic ideal, but it fails to 
reckon with the epistemic conditions of actual societies. If we want to promote the 
value of structural epistemic justice, then we ought to be thinking about how to 
design  
 
Work in media studies has been heavily influenced by the public sphere tradition in 
political theory, and critical internet studies provides us with a rich set of potential 
examples of online counterpublics, including curated blocklists on twitter (Geiger 
2016), Black twitter (Graham and Smith 2016, Brock 2020 C3), hashtag networks 
(Jackson, Bailey, Foucault Welles 2020), blogs (Knight Steele 2016a, 2016b, Gabriel 
2015), and BlackPlanet (Byrne 2007). Online counterpublic spaces can play a role in 
resisting epistemic oppression by providing safe havens and support networks 
(Geiger 2016, Sobieraj 2018), allowing marginalised groups to contest media 
narratives (Knight Steele 2016a, 2016b, Gabriel 2015), and allowing marginalised 
groups toorganise (Jackson, Bailey, Foucault Welles 2020).  
 
For the social epistemologist of social media the question is: is how can social media 
sites be designed to cultivate well-functioning counterpublics, enclaves, and satellite 
publics? This is partly a practical question, requiring experiments, drawing on case 
studies of successful and unsuccessful counterpublics, alongside normative work in 
social epistemology. Some of the questions that social epistemology can contribute to 
answering are: 
 
1. How should content moderation function for counterpublic spaces, bearing in 
mind that dominant conceptual resources may misinterpret the speech of 
marginalised groups (Frost-Arnold, forthcoming), and that members of 
counterpublics may be targeted for systematic harassment?  
2. How can sites designed for counterpublic spaces balance the need for privacy 
(to develop epistemic resources and avoid harassment), with the desire of 
counterpublics to influence the main public sphere? 
 
45 To be fair to Sunstein, he does note the importance of deliberative enclaves to public discussions, 
especially in context of epistemic oppression (2017 85-89, 254). However, his policy proposals focus 
on promoting a unified public sphere, and neglect the question of how to promote well-functioning 
counterpublics. 
3. How can we distinguish between well-functioning counterpublic groups, and 
deliberative enclaves which stifle collective epistemic progress? 
 
Identifying the tension between ideal epistemic structures and structures which 
contribute to ameliorating epistemic oppression is very much a first step, but it helps 
us to hold open space for projects to design social media sites that can support 
counterpublics, as well as addressing epistemic oppression in other ways. 
 
4.2.3. Individualism and Epistemic Justice  
 
In section 3.3., we saw that the consequentialist structure of individualist approaches 
to social epistemology means that individualism is unable to distinguish between 
different people and questions in ways that matter for structural epistemic justice, 
and that individualism countenances undermining the epistemic agency of 
marginalised groups if doing so is in the interests of the majority. In order to correct 
this gap, we need to think about epistemic justice, in particular about the 
distribution of epistemic outcomes, and the importance of protecting the epistemic 
agency of marginalised groups. As we noted above, conflicts between majority 
epistemic interests and epistemic justice can in principle break either way, and there 
may be some cases in which the epistemic interests of the majority justify some 
undermining of epistemic agency. However, in the majority of realistic cases the 
badness of epistemic oppression and very unequal distributions of epistemic 
outcomes trump maximising aggregate epistemic outcomes.46 In this section, we 
focus on demonstrating the importance of enriching the maximising perspective of 
individualism with considerations of epistemic justice, by showing that in order to 
think about the design of social media we need to think about the distribution of 
epistemic outcomes between individuals and questions, and the ways in which 
social practices that have good epistemic outcomes can nonetheless undermine the 
epistemic agency of minority groups. 
 
Above I suggested that issues about the distribution of epistemic outcomes—
especially accuracy—between people can be an issue for epistemic justice. Social 
media companies give everyone who uses them access to the same basic services in 
the form of the public website, but these services may work differently for different 
groups of people, or be differentially accessible for different groups of people. Many 
social media sites are designed primarily for English and other European languages, 
meaning that they offer importantly different services to non-English speakers. 
These differences can have epistemic consequences: if anti-misinformation efforts are 
focused on posts in English, then users who do not speak English or primarily speak 
 
46 An analogy: public buildings which are inaccessible for people who use wheelchairs or other 
mobility aids are a bad thing from the point of view of inclusion and equal access. In the majority of 
cases ensuring equitable access comes at a reasonable cost, and does not decrease the ability of people 
who do not use wheelchairs from using public buildings. However, in some special cases the benefits 
of ensuring accessibility for minority groups decreases the overall accessibility of a building. If the 
belltower of a gothic cathedral can only be accessed by a steep circular staircase, making the tower 
accessible for wheelchairs (for example by replacing the stair with a lift) might mean that overall 
fewer people are able to access the tower. 
another language will in aggregate come away from Facebook use with less accurate 
beliefs than English-speaking users. Many social media sites are also poorly 
designed for users with sensory impairments. For example, images on Twitter do 
not have automatic descriptions, and YouTube’s automated captions have frequent 
errors and don’t distinguish between different speakers. Failures of accessibility on 
social media means that users with accessibility needs will simply not be able to 
access information that is  presented in inaccessible ways. Issues about the 
distribution of  epistemic goods should be situated as part of a broader concern with 
design justice, concerning the ways in which technological systems distribute 
benefits and burdens differentially between different groups of people (Constanza-
Chock 2020).  
 
Besides concerns with the distribution of epistemic goods between individuals, we 
might also be concerned with the distribution of epistemic goods regarding different 
questions. Algorithmic newsfeeds typically promote certain kinds of content—posts 
from news sources, posts from friends, posts from smaller groups—and by so doing, 
they will prioritise users having accurate beliefs about different kinds of questions. 
Facebook’s reorganisation of their newsfeed in 2018 prioritised posts from connected 
users over posts from public sources including news media and businesses.47 One of 
the effects of this change is that using Facebook’s newsfeed will have a greater 
impact on users’ beliefs about what their friends are up to than their beliefs about 
current events. While it is possible that this change might be a good thing from the 
point of view of average accuracy (assuming that content about one’s friends is more 
accurate that news stories), we might be concerned that this change means that 
Facebook fails to provide accurate information relative to the set of important 
questions we collectively care about.48 
 
Finally, we ought also to be concerned about the ways in which pursuing 
majoritarian epistemic interests can indirectly lead to the epistemic exclusion of 
marginalised groups. There are an important class of social practices—which we 
might call epistemic accountability practices—which lead to good epistemic 
outcomes by allocating non-epistemic costs to people who act in ways that aren’t 
socially beneficial. For example, we might promote the goal of people sharing 
accurate information by allocating social sanctions to people who are discovered to 
have shared false information. Epistemic accountability practices are extremely 
common online: we might think of call-outs that aim to embarrass a unreliable user, 
calls to unfollow persistently deceptive users, as well as actions taken by sites to 
restrict users who share false information. While well-designed accountability 
practices may be good from the point of view of maximising epistemic goods, they 
may have an oversized effect on users who are already marginalised. These users 
may be less able to bear the costs of accountability practices, may receive 
disproportionate negative effects for flouting shared epistemic norms, and may be 
 
47 (Mosseri 2018) 
48 The ethics of question-choice is an important theme in feminist epistemology of science, see 
(Anderson 1995). 
more likely to be incorrectly accused of flouting epistemic norms. This unequal 
distribution of costs can have a number of negative effects: marginalised users may 
smother their own speech to avoid the costs of perceived norm flouting (Dotson 
2011), avoid contentious topics, or simply move to different social media sites 
without such rigorous accountability practices. Self-exclusion from spaces of public 
discourse and testimonial smothering owing to accountability practices are doubly 
problematic: they undermine users epistemic agency by making discursive spaces 
inhospitable environments, and it removes the specialised knowledge of 
marginalised people, meaning that epistemic communities become less diverse 
(Frost-Arnold 2014). While I don’t want to suggest that epistemic exclusion always 
trumps the pursuit of maximising good epistemic outcomes, acknowledging the 
costs of practices that are good for the majority of users complicates the assessment 
of social practices, highlighting the importance of centring marginalised groups in 
systems-oriented social epistemology.49  
 
5. How to Design an (Epistemically) better Social Media 
 
Critics of social media who are in the grips of the epistemic apocalypse narrative will 
often structure their critique around a specific epistemic vice of social media (the 
large amount of false posts, the existence of filter bubbles, algorithmic boosting of 
certain kinds of content), which their amelioratory proposals will centre around 
fixing that vice in a way that appeals to offline epistemic practices (add reputation 
systems, ‘mix up’ filter bubbles by adding random mixing of users, prioritise human 
editing over algorithmic filtering). While some of these proposals may be beneficial, 
our discussion of the conflicts between the different epistemic aims of social media 
highlights the importance of thinking about a number of different epistemic goals in 
a connected way. Adding a reputation system to a social media might help to reduce 
the amount of false information posted (Rini 2017), but it might also reduce the 
amount of true information posted, have chilling effects on the speech of 
marginalised groups, and undermine valuable transient diversity (Frost-Arnold 
2014). Mixing up information may break up problematic epistemic bubbles (in the 
sense of Nguyen 2019), but it also runs the risk of undermining the formation of 
well-functioning counterpublics that rely on filtering out certain kinds of posts (on 
the role of blocklists in maintaining counterpublics, see Geiger 2016). Prioritising 
human editorial work over algorithmic filtering might help to ameliorate the 
algorithmic boosting of certain kinds of content, but it runs the risk of replacing it 
with human-driven inverted epistemologies (a particular problem given current 
labour practices for content moderation, see Frost-Arnold forthcoming). One of the 
takeaways from this discussion is that the epistemic evaluation of social systems is 
complex, and has an important ethical aspect pertaining both to the moral 
importance of structural epistemic justice, and the ethical issues involved in the 
choice of epistemic outcomes.  
 
49 This paragraph is heavily influenced by Karen Frost-Arnold’s discussion of the epistemic benefits of 
anonymity (Frost-Arnold 2014). However, whereas Frost-Arnold articulates the harm of excluding 
marginalized groups in veristic terms, I focus on understanding this harm in terms of epistemic 
exclusion.  
 
Looking beyond simple fixes, what lessons can we draw for the projects of 
ameliorating existing social media sites, and (more realistically) designing new kinds 
of social media? Our focus has been on understanding the normative framework for 
evaluating social media sites, and we are now in a position to offer a characterisation 
of what a (re)designing project that draws on critical social epistemology ought to 
look like. 
 
- The critical social epistemology of social media is an ethical project. 
Choosing epistemic outcomes to promote presupposes ethical choices, and 
poorly designed epistemic systems can cause significant ethical harms. Many 
features of actually existing social media sites perpetuate significant epistemic 
oppression, and promote inverted epistemologies.   
- The critical social epistemology of social media is a conflictual project. 
There are important tradeoffs between promoting individual epistemic 
outcomes, creating epistemically good institutional structures, and respecting 
epistemic justice. The designers of social media platforms need to be upfront 
about which aims they are aiming to promote, and about the tradeoffs that 
they are making, and they need to be accountable to the groups who stand at 
risk of being harmed by their designs (Constanza-Chock 2020). Accountability 
will require that social media companies are much more open about what 
users do on their sites, and about the black-boxed algorithmic features of their 
services. 
- The critical social epistemology of social media is a pluralistic project. 
Social media sites can either be designed to balance off different epistemic 
aims, or they can be designed to promote specific epistemic aims leaving 
space for other sites to address the other aims. For example, it might be that 
highly connected and closely moderated sites are a good way to promote 
individual epistemic goods, whereas less connected sites that promote 
virtuous adverseriality, or involve voting mechanisms are a good way to 
realise collective epistemic goods, and more private sites aimed at different 
marginalised groups are a good way to promote counterpublic spaces. With 
that said, the exclusive pursuit of one value ought to have constraints: it 
would be bad if a site managed to realise group-level epistemic virtues by 
excluding all members of marginalised groups.  
- The critical social epistemology of social media is both a social and a 
technological project. The epistemic features of a social media platform 
supervene on the interaction between its technological features and the social 
practices of its users (see section 1). Predicting these interactions will be 
complex, and will likely involve some degree of path-dependence, so there 
will be an important element of experimentation and exploration in 
(re)designing projects. 
- The critical social epistemology of social media is an interdisciplinary 
project. This paper presupposes that normative theory, modelling of 
communication networks, and work in epistemology all have a role to play in 
(re)designing social media, but successful (re)design projects will need to 
draw not only on philosophy, but also on (at least!) sociology, political theory, 
science and technology studies, critical internet studies, computer science, 
social psychology, as well as the work of advocacy groups. If we want to 
think about social epistemology in a non-ideal way, we need to grapple with 
the problems of actually existing epistemic systems. 
- The critical social epistemology of social media is a project of imagination.  
The social media sites that are at the centre of public discourse (Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram, YouTube) operate on a common model that promotes a 
highly connected user-base, algorithmic newsfeeds which are designed to 
maximise use, and minimal content moderation.50 Part of our project in this 
paper has been to gather conceptual resources to frame different kinds of 
social media sites, and to go beyond the conservative project of reproducing 
offline practices online, but we have only really scratched the surface of 
possible design principles. What would a site look like which was designed 
around exploiting the Condorcet Jury theorem? What would a site look like 
which was organised around feminist approaches to objectivity? (Frost-
Arnold forthcoming) What would a social media site designed around 
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